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THE FREUDIAN SUPER-EGO:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL STUDY OF CONSCIENCE
During the last two decades there has been a significant
resurgence of interest in the study of moral development. After a
period of seeming agOersion to this topic, the study of moral
development has once again become an acceptable sphere of study
within the behavioral sciences. Particularly within psychology
an impressive array of men is presently engaged in serious study
in this field. A listing of influential figures would have to
include Jean Piaget, Robert Sears, and E. H. Erikson.'
On4thing which these otherwise varied theorists share is
the heritage of Freud. The influence of such Freudian concepts
as the "super•ego," "identification," and the "Oedipus complex"
has been enormous. These concepts have not been limited to
contemporary psychoanalytic theory and therapy, but they have also
helped shape the empirical study of conscience 'itbin academic
psychology. There is virtually no theory of moral development in
which some formative influence of Freud cannot be seen. The work
of many theorists, such as Erikson, has been an extension of Freud's
work, while the work of other theorists, such as Piaget, has been a
reaction to Freudian theory.
The primary purpose of this study is to examine Freud's concept
of the super-ego and its related concepts. This examination will be
conducted on the basis of Freud's collected works. Three monographs
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of Freud are of particular importance in a consideration of the
super-ego and its related concepts; these works are Mourning and
Melancholia,2 The Elm and the Id,3 and The Dissolution of the
Super-ego.4
This investigation of Freudian thought is intended for the
reader who possesses a working knowledge of psychoanalytic theory.
No attempt will be made to present Freud's thought in a complete and
ready-made theoretical structure for the convenience of the novice.
Rather, Freud's relevant theoretical advances will be presented
according to the uneven lines of their development.
The investigation of the Freudian super-ego and its related
concepts will be followed by a critique of Freud's theoretical
position. This will be done primarily on the basis of the theory
itself; that is, its organic unity, or lack thereof, and the theory's
ability to account for the available data.
A second major purpose of this study is to present the Pauline
concept of

GI-dfr'reiex-Yur

. Due to the limited nature of this

investigation, it will not be possible to investigate this term
throughout the New Testament. However, such a limitation would not
appear significantly to handicap this study. This is evidenced by
the fact that Paul's usage would appear to be normative for the
5
entire New Testament.
In conclusion this study will compare Freud's super-ego with
Paul's usage of conscience. Such an identification has often been
made, but there are few studies which have attempted an investigation
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of what their precise relationship is. Thus this study purposes to
further the investigation of this relationship by examining those
areas of Freud's super-ego and Paul's conscience which are similar
and dissimilar.
The Super-ego in Freudian Thought
Freud began writing about the moral functions of the mind
before 1900 in letters to his close friend Fliess. However, the
first published indication of Freud's growing interest in the problem
of moral prohibition is found in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900)6
in which Freud refers to the phenomenon of the censorship of dreams.
Freud concluded that in every human being there are two psychic
forces or systems. One of these forces forms the wish expressed
by the dream, while the other force exercises a censorship over this
dream-wish. This censoring force of the individual causes a distortion
in the dream. In this way the wish feelings inherentt in dreams are
repressed.?
With the publication of Totem and Taboo (1913),$ Freud's growing
concern with morality became explicit. Here he introduces the idea of
conscience and sees it as being an outgrowth of the taboo of
primitive cultures. "Conscience is the inner perception of objections
to definite wish impulses that exist in us . . . ."9 The oldest form of
conscience is to be found in the taboo. Taboo is likewise a command
of conscience which when violated produces a terrible sense of guilt.
Freud further theorized that conscience probably originated in
an ambivalent feeling toward an interpersonal relationship. Such an
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origin of conscience was suggested to him by his clinical work with
those suffering from compulsion neurosis. Compulsion neurosis is
characterized by a painful conscientiousness which reminded Freud
of an exabration of the normal conscience. Since he attributed
compulsive neurosis to the tension of two contrasting feelings,
one conscious and the other unconscious, Freud theorized that here
was an analogy which demonstrated the origin of conscience. The
conscience must result from the tension of two ambivalent feelings.10
Among the most important of Freud's writings is On Narcissism:
An Introduction (1914).11 Its importance stems from the pivotal role
it played in the evolution of Freudian thought. Perhaps the most
significant of its contributions is that it introduced the concept
of the "ego ideal" and the self-observing agency related to it,
which were the basis of what was eventually to be described as the
"super-ego."
In this work repression is discussed as a function of the ego.
Man has the tendency to set up in himself an ideal by which he then
measures his actual self. For the ego the formation of such an
ideal serves as the conditioning factor of repression.12
As the child grows older the narcissistic love that he once
had for himself is displaced on to this new ideal ego. Freud
continues;
It would not surprise us if we were to find a special
psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that
narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured
and which, with this end in view, constantly watches
the actual ego and measures it by that ideal. If such an
agency does exist, we cannot possibly come upon it as a
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discovery—we can only recognize it; for we may reflect
that what we call our "conscience" has the required
characteristics.i3
In Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1915-1917)14
Freud again returned to the topic which he had discussed in
On Narcissism: An Introduction. Whereas in this earlier work
Freud had stated that he would not be surprised to find a "special
psychical agency" within the ego, Freud was now willing to state
without qualification that there was "in the ego an agency which
unceasingly observes, criticizes and compares, and in that way sets
itself over against the other part of the ego."15
Freud in a letter dated May 31, 1897, to his friend Fliess had
dealt briefly with the topic of melancholia and identification. In
1915 Freud again dealt with this topic in a monograph entitled
Mourning and Melancholia.16 In this monograph Freud asserts that
somehow melancholia and mourning are connected. Mourning is regularly
a reaction to the loss of a loved one or some valued abstraction, such
as one's country or liberty. In other individuals these same influences
produce melancholia instead of mourning.
However, certain mental features do allow one to distiiguish.
between mourning and melancholia. Melancholia is characterized by
a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in
the outside world, loss of capacity to love, inhibition
of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding
feelings to a degree that finds utterance in selfreproaches and self-revilings, and cntelinates in a
delusional expectation of punishment.
The same is true of mourning except that the disturbance of self-regard
is Absent. Freud theorized that this difference would suggest that
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melancholia results when an object-loss is withdrawn from consciousness, whereas mourning results from an object-loss which remains
conscious. Thus in mourning it would seem perfectly natural that
there would be a loss Of interest and general inhibition since the
18 While in melancholia
ego is fully absorbed by the work of mourning,
this same loss of interest and general inhibition seems puzzling since
there would seem to be no realistic grounds for mourning.
An individual who suffers from melancholia represents himself to
others as worthless, incapable of any achievement, and morally wretched.
Freud saw in this behavior the fact that one part of the ego had set
itself apart over against the remainder of the ego. Thus one part of
the ego assumes a judicial function and takes the rest of the ego as
its object.19
One of Freud's observations in this regard is of critical
importance. While listening to melancholics' various self-accusations,
he could not avoid the impression that often the most violent of the
accusations were hardly applicable to the patient himself. However,
with a minimum of modifications these accusations did fit someone
whom the patient has loved, loves, or should love. Freud theorized
that what had taken place was that the self-reproaches perceived in
the patient were actually reproaches against a love-object which the
patient had shifted from the love-object to his own ego. Freud in
summarizing this process writes:
An object-choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular
person, had at one time existed; then, owing to a real
slight or disappointment coming from this loved person, the
object-relationship was shattered. The result was not the

normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this object
and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something
different, for whose coming-about various conditions seem
to be necessary. The object cathexis proved to have little
power of resistance and was brought to an end. But the
free libido was not displaced on to another object; it
was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not
employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish
an identification of the ego with the abandoned object.
Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the
latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as
though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this
way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and
the conflict between the ego and the loved person into
a cleavage between the critical activ4Ay of the ego and
the ego as altered by identification.
This form of identification Freud termed narcissistic identification. In one respect such identification is a regression since the
normal course of development begins with a narcissistic self-love and
then gradually the libido is detached from the self and becomes attached
to an object-choice. In narcissistic identification this course of
events has been revdrsed,
The importance of this monograph stems from the fact that Freud
here theorized that a portion of the ego under certain circumstances
may be set apart from the remainder of the ego. This separation
within the ego then results in a judicial function of a portion of
the egovAbis portion of the ego Freud referred to as conscience.
In 1923 Freud introduced the term super-ego to represent this
critical-judging portion of the ego. This was done in a monograph
entitled The le and the Id (1923).21 In this work Freud reassesses
the significance of his theorizations in Mourning and Melancholia.
Freud writes:
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We succeeded in explaining the painful disorder
of melancholia by supposing that (in those suffering from it) an object which was lost has been set
up again inside the ego--that is, that an objectcathexis has been replaced by an identification.
At that time, however, we did not appreciate the
full significance of this process and did not know
how common and typical it is. Since then we have
come to understand that this kind of substitution
has a great share in determining the form taken by the
ego and that it makes an essential contribu%kon towards
building up what is called itsmcharacter.""
Character formation is then the result of the process of identification. Identification occurs when an individual is forced to give up
a sexual object. At such a time there occurs an alteration of the ego
which Freud felt could best be described as "a setting up of the object
"23 Freud readily admits that the exact nature of
inside the ego • • • .
this substitution is at this time unknown, but suggests that identificat
tion may be the sole condition under which the id can give up its
objects. At any rate, Freud continues, "the character of the ego
is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and . . . it contains the
history of those object choices."24 While such a process of identifica
tion is most common, individuals do have varying capacities for
resistance. Such capacities for resistance decide the extent to whioth
the individual's character will resist or accept the influences of his
erotic object-choices.
identifications made in early childhood are particularly general
and lasting in their effect. Of extreme importance in character
formation is the first identification, the identification of the individual
with his father or mother. This first identification Freud referred to
as being both intricate and problematic. This results from two factors:
25
the Oedipus situation and the bisexuality of each individual.
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At an early age the male child develops an object-cathexis for
his mother. At first the child deals with his father by identifying
himself with him. However, as the child's sexual wishes toward his
mother become more intense, the child begins to perceive his father as
an obstacle. The child's relationship with his father now takes on hostile
coloring and changes into a wish to get rid of his father so that he
might take the father's place with the mother. This hostility of the
child toward his father varies in intensity and may best be described as
an ambivalent attitude. Simultaneously, his attitude toward his mother
is solely affectionate. Freud referred to this triangular situation
26
as the Oedipus complex.
On this occasion Freud does not deal with the dynamics involved
in the demolition of the Oedipus complex. Rather, Freud simply assumes
that such a dissolution will be the case. When the boy's objectcathexis of his mother must be given up, one of two things may happen.
There may take place either an identification with his mother or an
intensification of his identification with his father. The relative
strength of the child's sexual dispositions will determine whether the
outcome of the Oedipus situation will be an intensification of the
identification with the father or an identification with the mother. In
the case of the male child it would be more normal for the former to
occur. Thus the dissolution of the Oedipus complex would result in a
consolidation in the masculinity of the boy's character.27
The identification which follows the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex resulti in the super-ego's adoption of the attitudes and behavior
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of its object-choice. Thus the child strives to become like his parents.
But at the same time the content of the super-ego is not simply a
residue of the child's object-choice, for the super-ego also contains
powerful reaction-formations against its object-choices. Thus the
super-ego not only says, "You must be like your father," but also "you
may not be like your father;" that is, you may not do everything your
father does. This double aspect of the super-ego, Freud says, results
from the fact that the super-ego also has the task of repressing the
28
Oedipus complex.
In direct proportion to the intensity with which the individual
experienced the Oedipus complex is the influence that the super-ego
will have over the ego. This can be seen both in terms of the conscience's
strength and the amount of unconscious guilt.29
As the individual grows older, the role of his father is carried
on by teachers and other individuals in authority. Their injunctions.
and prohibitions, in turn, are assimilated into the super-egoand there,
in the form of conscience, continue to exercise moral censorship. Any
tension between the individual'd conscience and the actual performance of
30
his ego is experiencedas a sense of guilt.
As we have seen, the process of identification is dependent upon
the ending of the Oedipus complex. In 1924 Freud published a monograph
on this topic entitled The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex

On

this occasion Freud indicated that there were at least three possible
interpretations regarding the dissolution of the Oedipus complex.
His first suggestion is that it could be the result of a painful
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experience on the part of the child. The young boy could awaken one
day to find that his mother's love has been transferred to a new arrival
to the family. Thus he can no longer consider his mother to be his own
properiy.32
A second view is that the Oedipus complex must collapse, just as the
milk-teeth fall out when the permanent ones begin to grow. Thus the
Oefdpus complex would be considered a phenomenon determined and governed
by heredity, and it would consequently pass away at the appropriate
23
developmental stage.
However, it is a third view which Freud clearly favors and develops
in detail. As the male child develops sexually, his genitals become a
source of great interest. The child's interest is betrayed by the fact
that he manipulates them frequently. Adults do not approve of such
behavior. Finally the child is threatened. He is told that this part of
him which he values so greatly will be taken away from him. At first
the boy does not believe the threat, but this unbelief is sooner or
later broken down by the sight of the female genitals. The sight of a
little girl who is so much like himself except that she has no penis makes
the threat of castration suddenly become imaginable. The child is faced
with a conflict. At present the child stands in the Oedipus attitude
toward his parents. His masturbation is only a genital discharge of
sexual excitement belonging to the Oedipus complex. However, for him
to continue in such a way would cost him his penis. The cost is too
great, and the child's ego turns away from the Oedipus complex.34
With the repression of the Oedipus complex, the child gives up
his object-cathexes, and they are then replaced by identifications.
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The authority, attitudes, and values of the father or parents are
introjected into the ego, and there it forms the super-ego. To
this process we have previously made reference.
35
The Future of an Illusion (1927) contains only a brief reference
to the super-ego, but in this brief discussion Freud outlines an intriguing
characteristic of the super-ego. The super-ego, through a process of
transformation during the course of many generations, is capable of a
cultural strengthening. Freud declares:
It is not true that the human mind has undergone no
development since the earliest times and that, in
contrast to the advances of science and technology,
it is the same today as it was at the beginning
of history. We can point out one of these mental
advances at once. It is in keeping with the
course of human development that external coercion
gradually becomes internalized; for a special mental
agency, man's_` super-ego, takes it over and includes
it among its commandments. Every child presents
this process of transformation to us; only by that
means does it become a moral and social being. Such
a strengthening of the super-ego is a most_precious
cultural asset in the psychological field.jo
Freud once again examines the relationship of the super-ego to
culture or societylbaCivilization and Its Discontents (1930).37 Without
the super-ego. of the individual, society would not be able to exist
amidst the aggressiveness of its citizens. By means of the super-ego,
the individual's aggressiveness is introjected or internalized. In
this manner the harsh aggressiveness is turned back on the ego. If
it were not for the super-ego, these same aggressions would be unleashed
by the ego upon others.38
As would be expected, there develops then, a tension between the
ego and the super-ego. This results in a senseof guilt, which expresses
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itself as a need for punishment. In this way civilization further
gains control over the individual."
In Freud's last work, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940),"
Freud again returned to a theme which he mentioned in passing in
his earlier monograph, The Eal and the Id. There Freud had referred to
an identification which preceded that identification which resulted from
the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. This identification he refers to
as "primary identification." In 1940 Freud elaborated on whit
he had understood by primary identification.
The long period of childhood, during which the growing
human being lives in dependence upon his parents, leaves
behind it a'precipitate, which forms within his ego a
special agency in which this parental influence is prolonged. The parents" influence actually includes not merely
the personalities of the parentmthemselves but also the
racial, national, and family traditions handed on through
them as well as the demands of the immediate social milieu
which they represent. In the.same way, an individual's
super-ego in the course of his development takes over contributions.from later successors and substitutes of his
parents, such as teachers, admired figures in public life,
or high social ideals.*1
A Psychological Analysis
of the Freudian Concept of the Super-ego
During the history of mankind few theories have beewaubjected
to so much searching, and often bitter, criticism as has Freudian theory.
In modern times only Darwin's theory of evolution has been attacked,
reviled, ridiculed, and slandered with comparable vehemence. It is
not the intention of this study to present a history of such criticism.
Rather, this critique will consist in an analysis of the Freudian theory
ufA:
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of moral development. But prior to the critique itself, the
assumptions on which thisi evaluation will be made must' themselves
be made explicit.
Since the object of this evaluation is a theory, it would be
beneficial first to consider what a theory is. The working definition employed in this study is that a theory is "a cluster of relevant assumptions, systematically related to each other, and a set
of empirical definitions .442
According to this definition the assumptions upon which a theory
is based must be related directly to the empirical events or behavior of which the theory is an explanation. The good theory is
one which contains useful and predictive assumptions concerning
empirical events which are contained within the behavioral category
under investigation.43
Not only must the assumptions be stated clearly, but all of
the various elements contained in the theory must be explicitly
related to each other. Thus there must be rules which define the
manner in which the assumptions and concepts of the theory are
interrelated. In this way there will be a systematic interaction
within the theory in order that all of the internal relations are
clear.44
Finally a good theory must be capable of empirical definitions.
Such definitions are essential if there is to be interaction between
the concepts of the theory and reality. Without empirical definitions
it would be impossible to gather data, since . the concepts of the
theory would lack afttecedents in the empirical world.45
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If a theory is good, then it will lead to the observation
and collection of relevant empirical relations. In this way a good
theory will lead to a systematic expansion of knowledge. The function of a theory can be compared to a "proposition mill" which grinds
out related empirical statements which are then, on the basis of further
research, capable of confirmation or rejection. Secondly, a good
theory will permit the incorporation of known empirical findings into
a consistent and reasonably simple framework. Thus a theory tit also a
means of organizing and integrating all that is known concerning the
subject under consideration."
The gravest criticism of Freud's theory of moral development is
that his theory does not allow for empirical consequences. As was
noted above, a good theory must allow for the translation of its
concepts into empirical propositions. The concept of the super-ego
is not capable of such empirical definition. Although the concept
of the super-ego does help to "explain" certain phenomena, its explanation is of an after-the-fact variety And means very little. The superego is considered to be a bad theory Linasmstabh as it does not allow
for predictions in advance of actual behavior.
The concept of identification can be more readily translated
into empirical categories than can the super-ego, and yet this
Freudian concept likewise has severe limitations. Through this one
concept Freud attempted to explain mourning, conscience, and sexual
identity. Such an overarching theory seems to have been doomed from
the outset because of the diversity of behavior involved in mourning,
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conscience, and sexual identity. Possibly Freud would have been
47
better advised to theorize that there are three different determinants.
The inability of the same concept of identification to account
for such diversified phenomena as mourning and sexual identity can be
readily seen by comparing the identification said to result from mourning with the identification resulting from the dissolution of the
Oedipus complex. In the state of mourning, Freud maintained, the
mourner introjects the ego of the lost loveobject. However, the
identification with which the Oedipus complex ends does not result
in a similar introjection of the lost loye-object's ego; for if the
male child were to follow the dictates of the theory, he would introject
the ego of his mother. Such an introjection would transfer the sexual
identity of the mother to the boy. This clearly contradicts the
known empirical data; Most boys do not become girls. Rather,the male
child somehow introjects the ego of his father, and in this way his
sexual identity as a male is established. Identification under these
48
two circumstances appears to be two different processes.
In studying Freud's theory of.moral development, it readily becomes
evident that Freud labors under a limited view of what moralization involves.
For Freud the moralization of the child meant little more than the control
of sexual and aggressive behavior. Consequently, his treatment of the
topic of moral development is quite limited. The topics of moral
knowledge and moral thought are left untouched. It has not been until
the present century that this imbalance has been corrected and attention
has been given to the intellectual aspects of moral development.49
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Another criticism of Freud concerns his methodology. The research
of Freud which resulted in his theories did not take place in the controlled conditions of the laboratory. Rather, Freud's data came from
observations he made during the treatment of patients. Accordingly,
the conclusions he arrived at were made by a line of reasoning which
was rarely explicit. Freud's writings are confided to his conclusions.
The reader is asked to accept on faith the validity of his inductive
and deductive operations, for nowhere does he present the original
data, the method of analysis utilized, or any systematic presentation
of his empirical findings. Thus it is practically impossible to repeat
any of Freud's investigations.
And yet some of these liabilities of Freud's theory have also been
assets. Lionel Trilling and W. H. Auden recognized in Freud a deep
currentof romanticism. This can be seen in his "sense of the role of
impulse, of the drama of life, the power of symbolism, of the ways of
knowing that were more poetic than rational in spirit . . ."5°
The skillful way in which Freud employed mythological allusions to put
across abstruse concepts and his picturesque language are indicative of
this poetic spirit. The excitement of this spirit has gained for Freud
an enormous following. It is in this role that Freud has made his
greatest contribution to the study of moral development. Freud asked
questions which he was unable to answer completely. However, in
addition to the questions, Freud also provided the motivation for
continuing study.
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The Concept of Conscience in Pauline Usage

The word "conscience" (

e7

) is derived from the stem

, which means "I know in common with." The

of the verb (fL/K

stem implies knowledge about another person which can be used in witness
51
for or against him.
In the New Testament the word suneidesis appears thirty times.
53
53
There are three occurrences in Romans,
eleven in Corinthians,
six in
54
55
56
the Pastorals,
five in Hebrews,
three in I Peter,
and two in Acts.57
Any attempt to determine the meaning of suneidesis in the New
Testament must differ from most similar quests in the New Testament, for
the word suneidesis makes virtually no appearance in the Septuagint.
Consequently, no recourse can be made to any Hebrew idea in the Old
Testament which might serve to elucidate the meaning of suneidesis for
the New Testament writers.

58

The Hebrewi failure to develop an examined theory of conscience comes
as no surprise when one considers their theological emphases. Hebrew
thinking is strongly theocentric and not introspective. God as King
and man as obedient servant is emphasized. The obedience which God
demands has been revealed to man from a source outside of man. Thus
the Law and the Prophets, not knowledge of self (including the conscience),
teach the fear of the Lord and are the beginning of wisdom. Hence, there
was present no strong urge to examine the inner motives of man's behavior
and man's subjective psychological phenomena.59
This leads to the conclusion that the question of the origin of
the New Testament's usage of suneidesis can be answered in one of two
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manners. Either the New Testament authors invented this word to
describe an experience which was peculiar to Christianity, or they
must have adopted the word and the ideas connoted by it from some
non-Hebrew source. Accordingly, the search for a possible source of
New Testament usage must n9w turn to the Gentile world.
A study of the surviving literary remains of the Hellenistic world
reveals that the Greek usage of suneidesis can be divided into two
categories. On the one hand, suneidesis was used by the philosophers in
technical or semi-technical writings. Here it was used in a nonmoral context and can best be paraphrased "I am conscious within my
self that . . . ." From this technical sense suneidesis evolved into an

"everyday" word. In the latter usage the meaning of suneidesis became
the content of the individual's consciousness of his own acts or
behavior in terms of their moral quality."
Since the New Testament authors did not write for professional
philosophers, it is the latter colloquial usage of suneidesis which
concerns this study. Within the context of this "popular folk-wisdom,"
suneidesis was viewed as a faculty implanted in man, which was his by
right of his very nature. Thus suneidesis functioned by necessity, as
an expression of man's constitution. Therefore, every man was thought
to have a suneidesis.61
The suneidesis comes into activity in connection with a person's
own deeds. The subject of an individual's suneidesis is the quality
of his own acts and character and is not concerned with the acts and
character of others.62
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Suneidesis concerns itself almost exclusively with acts or deeds.
Its reference to character only takes place in so far as character is
both determined and expressed by specific acts.63 Likewise, it is with
past acts that the suneidesis concerns itself. It is specific acts of
past wrong-doing as opposed to a continued and habitual condition of
64
character which calls forth the suneidesis.
Finally, the Hellenistic "popular philosophy" viewed the suneidesis
as emerging in pain. Man is so formed by his nature that if he oversteps
the moral limits of nature, he normally feel pain.65 This pain might
best be described as a combination of fear and shame which results in
66
guilt. This guilt, in turn, paralyses and destroys the individual.
Due to the limitations of this study, the consideration of the
New Testament use of suneidesis must be confined to the Pauline corpus.
There is good evidence that such a limitation will not seriously distort
the general New Testament usage. This is evidenced to by the fact that
Paul is the first of the New Testament authors to use suneidesis.
Secondly, Paul uses suneidesis more than any other Biblical writer.
Thirdly, Paul builds more upon this term than does any of the other
New Testament authors. Consequently, it has been most common to accept
Paul's usage of suneidesis as normative for the early Christian community
and likewise normative for the sacred Scriptures produced by this
67
community.
For the purposes of this investigation, the Pauline usage of
suneidesis will be considered on the basis of the Corinthian and
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Roman epistles. It is not within the scope of this study to engage in
questions of authorship. The Corinthian and Roman epistles age generally
accepted as by Paul himself, but a strong body of competent opinion
denies the Pauline authorship of the Pastorals. Hebrews, in turn, is
an anonymous piece of writing, and nowhere does it claim the authorship
of Paul. Thus this study will directly concern itself with the use of
suneidesis only in the Corinthian and Roman epistles.
Paul assumes that all men possess the faculty of suneidesis. Paul's
argument in the second chapter of Romans makes it apparent that Paul
viewed man's suneidesis as something man possessed by reason of his very
68
nature as a man.
For Paul suneidesis concerns itself primarily with individual deeds.
Paul's extended discourses in Corinthians regarding the giving of offense
to the weak concerns itself with specific deeds, the eating of meat
offered to idols while in the presence of less enlightened Christians."
Paul's usage is once again in agreement with the usage common to the
Hellenistic world; he too viewed suneidesis as primarily concerning
44001 with individual acts and only secondarily with character.
Likewise, Pauline usage of suneidesis indicates that its object
is always acts of wrong-doing. Suneidesis tells man that he is doing
something which is wrong. The function of suneidesis is seen as passing
a negative judgment." Suneidesis can only showman what is right in
the sense that he fails to feel remorse after the questionable act has
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been committed.
Not until the third century and onward does conscience
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come to be thought of as a "positive, selective power enabling us to
know what is right before we do it . . . • " This function of the
suneidesis is foreign to both the fourteen Pauline occurrences and
common Greek usage. 72
The object of suneidesis according to Pauline usage is always past
acts. There are no occurrences in Paul which parallel modern English
usage,which makes conscience a guide to future action. Suneidesis only
functions in terms of past acts or deeds. Thus the absence of any
conscience pangs cannot be taken as conclusive proof as toi.the moral
quality of any intended acts."
In accordance with common Hellenistic usage, Paul held that
suneidesis emerges in the life of the individual as pain. In counselling
the Roman Christians to accept the authority of their government, Paul
cautions that disobedience not only means the wrath of God but also
trouble from one's suneidesis.74 From the context it is clear that the
trouble cautioned against is the pain of a guilty suneidesis.
As can readily be seen, Paul has in general taken over the popular
Greek usage of suneidesis.75 But at the same time, Paul did make
significant alterations as to its basic connotations, although the
alterations are primarily in regard to details. Paul placed it within
the setting of the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of God as both righteous
Creator and sustainer of all things. This God judges all men by the
absolute moral standards inherent in the divine nature, as revealed in
the person of Christ Jesus.76
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Perhaps the most significant alteration introduced by Paul was his
emphatic distinction between the strong and weak suneidesis. In his
letters to the church at Corinth Paul recognizes the existence of
variability among the suneidesis of different individuals. This may
be due to a lack of knowledge, a force of habit, or a lack of ability
77
The significance of such a
to withstand the example of others.
distinction is to be found in its ethical implications. 88cause the
Christian stands within the context of God's glory, it is necessary that
he always be conscious of the fact that his brother's suneidesis may
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react differently than his.
Paul never viewed suneidesis as his crowning "moral doctttne."
In fact, there is every reason to believe that Paul introduced
suneidesis into Christianity under the compulsion of his encounter with
the Corinthian church. Perhaps the Corinthians defended their practice
of eating meat offered to idols by pointing to their sundidesis. Paul's
immediate reaction had been to perceive both the liability of suneidesis
to error through defective knowledge and its major defect as an ethical
79
norm, its negativity.
The probability that this term was one forced
upon him by his opponents at Corinth is heightened by the fact that
while dealing with an identical topic in Romans 14:15 as in I Cor. 8:10,
Paul avoids the term entirely. Paul's usage of suneidesis can be partially
accounted for by the policy of his ministry that he would be all things
80
to all men.
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A Comparison of Freud's Super-ego and Paul's Conscience
and Freud's
In conclusion, a comparison will be made between PaullsAconcepts
of conscience. In the past these concepts have been almost glibly
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equated without a thorough understanding of their relationship.
These concluding remarks will sketch their relationship and make explicit
their points of agreement and disagreement.
A first point for comparison is their respective theories regarding
the origin of conscience. Freud theorized that conscience was the
result of identification, and identification was primarily the result
of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. In effect, Freud was saying
that morality is not instilled by God but is acquired from society or
82
Paul stands in disagreement with Freud on
more directly from parents.
the question of origin. Paul views conscience as a faculty which man possesses by right of his humanity. To this extent the influence of
Hellenistic thought can be seen in Paul. In addition, Paul modified
the Greek concept of the conscience's origin by implicitly tracing its
origin to God. 83
Conscience serves as a judicial function for both Freud and
Paul. Freud views the super-ego or conscience as a psychfal agency
within the individual which constantly observes, criticizes and compares
the actual behavior of the individual;with an ideal self.84 Paul's usage
does not significantly differ from this aspect of Freudian usage.
Both Freud and Paul agree as to the pervasiveness of the
phonomenon of conscience. Bach viewed every man as possessing this
faculty.
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Likewise, each agreed that not all consciences were equally
operative. Freud theorized that the level to which an individual's
conscience develops is a function of the intensity of the Oedipus
complex experienced by the individual. Freud pointed to women as
validating this point. Since they are not able to experience the
Oedipus complex to the same degree as do men, women tend to be less
moral than men.85 Paul also divided consciences into categories which
reflect different levels of efficiency. Paul recognizes the existence
of such a variability when he speaks of strong consciences and weak
86
consciences.
During the previous study of Pauline usage, it was concluded
that for him the conscience always had as its object past events. For
Paul the realm of the conscience was not future behavior. This observation is not true of Freudian usage. Freud thought of conscience as
having a broader role. The significance of the conscience could be
seen in planning and future decisions. The content of the conscience
contained innumerable attitudes and values which had been introjected from
lost love-objects. For example, a woman might have a compulsion for
chocolate candy because her lover, who later jilted her, was particularly
fond of chocolate candy.
Another area of agreement between Freud and Paul is that the object
of one's conscience is always his own behavior. Guilt results only when
we violate the dictates of our conscience. Guilt never results when
someone else violates the dictates of our conscience.
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In Freudian theory the conscience tells the individual what he
should do and also what he should not do. Thus in this respect the
super-ego once again occupies a broader sphere of direction than does the
Pauline conscience. The Pauline conscience only functions in response
to wrong-doing. Conscience is always evoked as a negative response.
Freud and Paul are once again in agreement that when one ignores
the dictates of his super-ego or conscience, pain as a consequence
normally follows. Paul was satisfied to accept this aspect of conscience
as defined by the Hellenistic world. Freud has elaborated on the pain
more than has Paul. Freud sees this pain as arising because of the tension
between the ego and the super-ego. This tension or pain is experienced
most directly in the form of guilt.
One of the major differences in their respective treatments accorded
the concept of conscience higges on the relative importance of this concept for their work as a whole. In the case of Freud, the super-ego is
of key importance. Through this concept Freud accounts for the ability
of society to contain the aggressive and hostile impulses of man. Without
the super-ego, life within a social context would be impossible. But
such importance is not accorded the conscience in the overarching theology
of Paul. Paulamerely accepted this concept and assimilated it into his
theology because of his pastoral concerns with the church at Corinth.
Thus the concept of conscience for Paul never approaches the importance
accorded it by Freud.
No comparison between Freud and Paul could be complete without first
considering their respective views of men. Freud lived and worked within
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a world that saw man as the summit of an evolutionary process. In man God
or nature had shown a persistent wisdom in its effort to produce a final
product. This was the image of man which Freud's theory so significantly
altered. Freud presented man as the unfinished product of nature. He
saw man struggling against unreason, driven by drives and urges which
must be contained if man were to live in society. Man was host both
to seeds of madness and majesty. "What Freud was proposing was that
man at his best and man at his worst is subject to a common set of
explanations: that good and evil grow from a common process
Paul's anthropology to a certain extent coincides with that of Freud.
He too saw the countless evil forces with which man was daily forced to
contend. And yet Paul could have never agreed with the pessimism inherent
invxdiew that "good and evil both grow from a common process." For Paul
all good had its foundation in Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God.
It was because of this focal position of the Christ that conscience
need not play a more vital role in the thought of Paul. Freud's theory
demanded a conscience of super-ego so that a social form of life could
be a possibility. But Paul saw social life as possible because men had
been created in the image of God. Despite the distortion of this image
in sin, God still sustained life. The conclusive testimony to the
sustaining providence of God was the incarnation, death, and resurrection
of Jesus Christ.
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